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The question of German responsibility for the first world war is
one that still produces considerable debate among historians. Although it
appears that many present day scholars place the war guilt at Germany’s
door, some have produced cogent arguments designed to relieve Germany of
this accusation.
This paper does not propose to present a definitive answer to the
intricate question of German responsibility. Rather an attempt will be
ma4e to examine the historic role of Germany prior to and during World
War I. It is believed that such an analysis will be a valuable study,
inasmuch as it will point out, in a capsule form, some of the issues in
volved in the debate on German responsibility.
In approaching this question, a brief examination will be made of
several selected factors influencing Germany’s conduct on the eve of the
war. This will include such potent factors as resurgent nationalism, en
tangling alliances, increasing militarism, intense conmiercial rivalry, and
repeated involvement in international disputes. These factors seem to be
necessary essentials for a clear understanding of motivactions that promt
ed German behavior in the face of war.
Also Austro-German diplomatic relations will be examined, with
especial emphasis being placed on the aftermath of the Sarajevo incident.
Since this is the period that most firmly supports the proponents of
ii:i~
German war guilt, it will receive considerable attention. The outbreak of
the hostility and German’s reaction will be briefly discussed.
While this short paper cannot be expected to answer such an
intricate question, the writer feels that a presentation of pros and cons
in this debate will point up many issues which should be of value to novice




FACTORS INVOLVING GERMANY’S CONDUCT ON THE EVE OF THE WAR
Did Germany cause World War I? This crucial question, studied and
analyzed by dozens of scholars, is still a burning issue after fifty-three
years. Many of the scholars in the United States and Europe at the time
of the war passionately believed that Germany was the cause of the First
World War because of her militaristic outlook. The Allies were under
this opinion also, and as a result imposed a harsh and Carthaginian peace
on Germany. The Germans were forced to accept Article 231 of the Treaty of
Versailles on pain of occupation, which stipulated:
The Allied and Associated Governments affirm, and Germany
accepts, the responsibility of herself and her allies, for
causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Asso
ciated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as
a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression
of Germany and her allies.2
Although feelings of retribution had earlier run high, by the
latter 1920’s a number of historians were clamoring for the annulment of
the war guilt clause. Such historians as Count Max Montgelas, Erich Brand
enburg, Harry Elmer Barnes, George Peabody Gooch, and Sidney Bradshaw Fay
1Harry E. Barnes, The Genesis of the First World War: An Intro






introduced revisionist literature ameliorating Germany of guilt.
According to Sidney Fay, “it is a dictum exacted by victors from vanquish
ed under the influence of the blindness, ignorance, hatred, and the propa
gandist misconceptions to which the war had given rise. It was based on
evidence which was incomplete and not always sound.”2
But is this true? Many say yes. Germany’s role in the world
conflagration of 1914 began with the unification of Germany under Otto
von Bismarck’s chancellorship. Bismarck, within a single generation made
Prussia the leading country on the Continent, defeated her rivals, achieved
unification of Germany, and made Prussia the center of the new state.3 Un
der his tutelage Germany underwent almost unparallel growth in industry,
commerce, and agriculture.4
The Germans were exuberant over their successes in 1870 and the
subsequent marvelous development of the united German Empire. Their suc
cesses led to an exaggerated nationalism that began to express itself dur
ing Bismarck’s chancellorship. From 1890, Germany advanced to a world
power and strove to become the greatest power in the world. Turner con-
tends that, “The outlook of German leaders became wider, their ambition
1Dwight E. Lee, The Outbreak of the First World War: Who Was
Responsible? (Rev. ed.; Boston: D. C. Heath & Co.,~ 1966), pp. 5, 8,
12, and 26.
2Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War (New York:
MacMillan Co., 1928), II, 549.
3
Edward Raymond Turner, Europe Since 1870 (New York: Doubleday,
Page and Co., 1923), p. 189.
4charles Seymour, The Diplomatic Background of the War 1870-1914
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), p. 61.
5Barnes, o~. cit., p. 51.
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vaster and grander; they played for great stakes higher and more boldly,
until in the end, as it seemed to one of them, they sought World Dominion
or Downfall.”1 Bismarck sought to maintain Germany’s hegemony peacefully.
On the other hand, when William II in 1890 took control, the foreign poli
cy was altered. Unlike Bismarck, he allowed his nationalistic desires to
antagonize England and drive France toward Russia. William II allowed
Germany to succumb to exaggerated nationalism which was to sink her into
a world war.
When Germany became unified the arrangement of Europe was shattered.
After the defeat of France in 1871, the balance of power was shifted from
France to Germany. This led one historian to remark, “where European
politics had for centuries been based upon the principle of a weak German
center and strong French, Austrian, and Russian extremities, the table had
now been turned.”2 France was destroyed militarily and stripped of the
Alsace and Lorraine regions. On the other hand, Germany stood basking in
her new found leadership and military victory. The scene provoked one
diplomat to remark, “that Europe has lost a mistress and gained a master.”3
After the defeat of France and the unification of Germany, Bismarck
set out to maintain the status quo. He was not bent on a role of imperial
ism, but wanted to consolidate his gains. In the meantime he had to concern
himself with France and Russia. He was aware that France was searching
for the opportune moment to regain her position in the balance of power and
1Turner, op. cit., p. 191.
2. . .William L. Langer, European Alliances and Alignments 1871-1890
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), p. 15.
3lbid.
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Alsace and Lorraine. In her attempt to accomplish her objectives, he
feared the possibility of Russia joining forces with her. Bismarck dreaded
the idea of encirclement which would cause Germany to fight on more than
one front at a time. He saw possible defeat for Germany in fighting on
more than one front since ttshe was surrounded on land and sea by powerful
1enemies . . .
In an attempt to rid himself of the fear of encirclement, Bismarck
thought it necessary to form several alliances. As seen by Barnes, ~os
tensible planned in the interests of defense and peace, they actually pro
duced suspicion, fear, and aggression.”2 In 1878, Bismarck negotiated a
secret treaty with the Dual Monarchy. It was known as the Dual Alliance
and provided the cornerstone for Bismarck future alliances. The Dual Al
liance provided that if either Germany or Austria-Hungary were attacked
by Russia or a party backed by Russia the other would aid their distressed
ally. If either of the signatories were attacked by any power except Russia,
the others would maintain benevolent neutrality.3
By the conclusion of the Dual Alliance, Bismarck was able to
guarantee Austria’s neutrality in case of a war with France and at the
same time guarantee the Peace of Frankfort. According to Seymour, “the
position that Germany had won by the Peace of Frankfort was thus stamped
with the character of stability and permanence.”4
‘Barnes, op. cit., p. 231.
2
Ibid., p. 67.
3Langer, op. cit., p. 183.
4Seymour, op. cit., p. 31.
5
In 1882, Italy joined this group and the name was changed to the
Triple Alliance. It provided that Germany and Italy were to aid each other
in case of aggression byFrance, and if any of the partners were attacked
by two or more great powers, all three were pledged to assist one another.
It also provided that if one of the signatories felt its security •to be
in danger and had to go to war, the other two had to follow a policy of
benevolent neutrality. The extension of the Dual Alliance, although
defensive promoted Germany to a position to be feared. As Turner has
pointed out:
The Triple Alliance was to be a considerable extent
defensive, but by means of it Bismarck had none the less
raised the German Empire to be the control1in~ power in
Europe and to a marvelous pitch of greatness.L
Bismarck formed other alliances to supplement the alliance with
Italy and the Dual Monarchy. In 1883, he associated Rumania with the
Triple Alliance having negotiated a treaty which was aimed at mutual pro
tection against a Russian attack.2 Another treaty, the Re-insurance Treaty
was signed with Russia in 1887. This treaty was negotiated behind the
back of Austria-Hungary. It provided for the recognition of Russia’s po
sition in the Balkan and neutrality if one of the powers went to war.3
The rival Triple Entente was of a more recent date than the Triple
Alliance, having originated in a series of agreements between France,
Russia, and England which came Co completion in 1907. The first agreement
‘Turner, op. cit., p. 182.
Hammann, The World Policy of Germany 1890-1912, trans.
Maude A. Huttman (London: George Allen ~ Unwin, Ltd., 1927), p. 45.
3Pay, op. cit., I, 78.
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Within a few years, Great Britain moved toward closer relations
with France and Russia. Long an advocate of splendid isolation, Great
Britain had become impressed with the dangers of isolation by the hostility
shown her as a result of the Boer War, the rise of German naval power, and
the costly competition with France in Africa and Russia in Central Asia.
Britain’s position had been exposed during the Boer War when Europe ex
pressed sympathy for the Boers. Germany showed her hostility toward the
English actions by sending a congratulatory telegram to President Kruger
on the capture of the Jameson Raiders and lauding:
his success in conquering the disturbers of the peace
by his own efforts, and in defending the independence of his
country against attacks from1outside without appealing for
the help of friendly Powers.
This act produced a great deal of hostility in England toward Germany.
The English saw it as, “an unwarrantable interference in the internal
affairs of the British Empire.”
This hostility probably would have dissipated if it had not been
for the German naval laws, which threw British public opinion into an
uproar. This act on the part of Germany was regarded by the British as
a challenge to their position as mistress of the sea. It also clearly re
vealed their need for a change in policy. Having failed on several oc
casions to reach an understanding with Germany, Great Britain now turned
to France and negotiated an alliance in 1904 providing for a friendly set
tiement of their differences in Egypt and Morocco. In the Entente Cordiale
‘Erich Brandenburg, From Bismarck Co the World War: A History of
German Foreign Policy 1870-1914, trans. Annie E. Adams (London: Oxford
University Press, 1927), p. 271.
2lbid., p. 85.
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they promised to give each other a free hand in Egypt, whereas France was
to have a free hand in Morocco.1 In 1907 a similiar agreement was made
between England and Russia. The Grey-Izvolsky Agreement provided for a
division of spheres of influence in Persia. Persia was carved into three
zones, the British received the south, the Russians received the north,
and the Shah of Persia was allowed to keep the middle. Fay quoting from
a certain cartoon in Punch said:
the British lion and the Russian bear are seen
mauling between them an unhappy Persian cat; the lion is
saying to the bear, “Look here~ You can play with his
head, and I can play with his tail, and we can both stroke
the small of his back; awhile the poor cat moans, ‘~I don’t
remember having been consulted about this.”2
The agreement also provided for the recognition of Afghanistan, and a
joint promise to respect the integrity of Tibet.
These alliances, defensive or offensive, created a tense and
warlike atmosphere in Europe. Their presence created a great deal of tur
moil and animosity among the countries. As a result of these alliances,
many states became embroiled in political and diplomatic clashes. Each
state refused to back down or make concessions during a clash, because
she felt that she had the support of her allies. Therefore, each diplo
matic or political clash became a potential danger to the peace and
security of Europe and the World.
This diplomatic activity was accompanied by vigorous military
preparation on the part of the powers. This preparation was not carried
1
Fay, op. cit., I, 162-3.
____ pp. 220-1.
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out by Germany and Austria-Hungary only, but by England, Italy, Russia,
France, and Serbia as well. As pointed out by Hubatsch:
on the eve of the First World War, even little states
were seized by an armament-fever: they wished to be able
to protect themselves as well as possible in the coming con
flict which they considered unavoidable. The threat of war
persuaded the European powers to enforce their alliance
groupings and above all to increase their own military
preparations.1
Each tried to improve the number and quality of their troops and armaments.
The countries tried to increase the number of men in the army by enacting
new army laws. These laws called for an increase in the number of recruits
for military service.
In 1913, Germany passed an army bill which was to add 300,000 men
to its peacetime army in two years. This bill failed in its objectives,
it did not increase the number of army corps nor did it provide for the
number of recruitments the government desired. Austria, in accordance
with her ally, proceeded to raise the number of her recruits to 200,000.
France and Russia had more success with their recruting than the major mem
bers of the Triple Alliance. France lowered the age for recruits and
raised the liability of service, and introduced the three-year service pro
gram. Russia as far back as 1905 started to build up her army. By 1913
2
her strength had rose to 580,000 men in arms.
1Walther Hubatsch, Germany and the Central Powers in the World
War 1914-1918, ed. Oswald P. Backus (Lawrence, Kansas: University of
Kansas Publications, 1963), p. 13.
Count Mas Moatgelas, The Case for the Central Powers (New York:
Alfred A. K.nopf, 1925), pp. 104-6.
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The following table represents the peace strength of the great
powers in 1899, 1907, and 1914.1
TABLE 1
PEACE STRENGTH OF THE GREAT POWERS IN 1899, 1907, and 1914
1899 1907 1914
Germany 604,000 629,000 806,000
Austria 346,000 382,000 370,000
Italy 258,000 284,000 305,000
France 574,000 559,000 818,000
Russia 896,000 1,254,000 1,284,000
As the countries tried to increase the strength of their armies,
their military expenditures increased proportionately. Each country spent
more money on its army during the early 1900’s than ever before. In terms
of total expenditures for defense from 1905-1914, Russia and Germany had
the largest budgets, and were followed in order by France and Austria.
The following table shows the expenditures for arms on the part
2
of the major powers from 1905-1914.
TABLE 2





‘Barnes, op. cit., p. 55.
____ p. 56.
11
Back of the German-English antagonism, which had increased
steadily in the first decade of this century lay naval rivalry. The
Germany navy came into existence as a result of the naval laws of 1898
and 1900.1 It was to be carried to completion in 1917. The British
public and admiralty was not slow to react to this gesture which they saw
as a challenge. The German plans as stated by Fay:
created an atmosphere of suspicion and antagonism
which was altogether unfavorable for friendly diplomatic
agreements concerning the Bagdad Railway and other matters.
Every increase in the German navy, instead of frightening
the British into making concessions, tended to stiffen
their opposition and their determination to maintain the
wide margin of British naval superiority deemed vita~ to
the safety and very existence of the British Empire.
As early as 1904, the British fleet was reorganized so as to
retain an overwhelming strong force in the North Sea.3 The next two years
saw the British revolutionizing naval warfare by launching the dreadnought,
a floating fortress which was faster and carried heavier armanents.4 These
ships gave the British naval superiority over anything afloat.
In 1906 and 1908, Germany enacted additional navy laws, not with
the intention of building a fleet equal to Britains, but rather:
to give expression to the greatness of the new Germany
by creating a fleet which should be comparable to her grow
ing commerce and colonial interests and afford them protection.
I






Brandenburg, op. cit., p. 271.
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They desired preservation from the danger of being blockaded
from food and raw materials in case of war. But above all,
they wanted to have a naval force which could be used to back
up German diplomatic arguments in the struggle for colonial
and commercial advantages.1
The German navy often termed the “risky navy” was strong enough to make
the British hesitate and strong enough to lend support to her colonial
demands.
The British were interested in slowing down the German military
program in order to lessen the tension between Germany and England and
lighten their military budget. In Germany, after Bethmann-Hollweg became
chancellor in 1909, there was a real desire to improve relations with
Britain. The Germans, because of adverse English feeling, thought about
retarding the rate of construction and defending the coast by submarines,
mines, and fortification rather than by dreadnoughts.2 As early as 1908,
according to Gooch:
Admiral Galster argued that Germany’s defensive needs would
be better served by light cruisers, submarines and coast-
defences than by the construction of battleships which, how
ever unaggressive in i~tention were bound to arouse the
suspicions of England.
As a result of German and British efforts, negotiations were carried on
in an attempt to come to some sort of an understanding on naval matters.
These negotiations proceeded at a slow pace until after the Balkan crisis
I
Pay, ~9p_. cit., I, 234.
2Montgelas, op. cit., p. 109.
3G. P. Gooch, Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy (New York:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1927), p. 42.
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when the urgency for a naval agreement seemed more pressing than ever.
In 1912, a mission to discuss the naval situation headed by Viscount Haldane
went to Berlin.
The British had as their major objective to put an end to the naval
rivalry that had prevailed for the last fifteen years.1 They wanted to
retard the building program of the new German navy law of 1912. The Ger
mans in exchange wanted the British to agree to a mutual declaration of
neutrality in case either went to war. The two powers were unable to come
to any sort of agreement, and so the Haldane Mission like other such at
tempts ended in failure. This particular mission failed as pointed out
by BloCh because:
William II and his advisers sought to tie England’s hands
and made any understanding between England and Germany con
ditional upon a promise of British neutrality in the event
of a Franco-German war.2
The failure of the Haldane Mission drove the English in September,
1912, to negotiate an Anglo-French Naval Convention. In this Convention,
England promised to support France against Germany. Grey in summing up
this position said, “that England was in honour bound to protect the
3
French.coast in case of a war with Germany.” By this time the naval
race was on hotter than ever. Each country increased its naval expendi
tures several times over. In the ten years prior to the outbreak of the
war, the joint expenditures of Russia and France were greater than those
‘Camille Bloch, The Causes of the World War, trans., Jane Soames
(London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1935), p. 26.
2lbid
3Hammann, op. cit., p. 254.
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of Germany and the Dual Monarchy. England’s expenditures doubled those
of her other two allies combined. The following chart attests to this
1
fact. It indicates the comparative naval expenditures from 1904 to 1914.
• TABLE 3







Excess of France and Russia
for 10 years $ 70,069,922
During the same period the
British naval expenditure was $351,916,576
Because of Germany’s army and naval plans, many have been led to
charge her with preparing for the war. The facts, however, show just the
opposite picture. Germany, a country with twice as many people as France,
dragged behind Russia and France in trained manpower. From this one may
deduce that France existed in a state of heavy preparedness. Germany did
not spend as much on defense as Russia. In comparing the military pre
paredness of the continental powers, Barnes said, “. . . it is well known
that the French and Russians made much more progress in military prepara
tions between 1911 and 1914 than did the Germans.”2
1Barnes, op. cit., p. 59.
2lbid., p. 58.
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Although Germany’s navy was a risky one, no will for war can be
reduced from it. Montgelas contends that:
a naval power with thirty-five battleships, and a
total tonnage of 1.02 million could not be a menance to
Britannia, who ruled the seas with her sixty battleships,
and a tonnage of 2.17 million.1
The British blew the question of German naval building program out of
proportion. The program was geared toward defensive aims and not of fen
sive ones. As a result of the British alarm, the rivalry between Germany
and England became a reality that was to haunt them and hang over Europe.
This rivalry along with Europe being an armed camp had the effect of draw
ing the world closer to a general war with every conflict.
Commercial rivalry played its role in preparing the world for a
war. During the late 1800’s and early 1900’s, the powers were involved
in commercial and trade rivalry. The powers, after becoming highly in
dustrialized began to search for colonies as places for investments, raw
materials, food supplies, and markets for surplus goods. Consequently,
there was a movement among the powers of the world to acquire possession
of the unclaimed regions. According to Pay, “the Great Powers began to
partition Africa among themselves, to secure territory or exclusive spheres
of influence in China and to build railroads in Turkey and elsewhere.”2
Prior to 1914, many of the countries had not fulfilled their
imperialistic plans. The unclaimed land gave out before they could acquire
additional territory or realize their set goals. However, they continued
to push forward their plans of expansion. In the opinion of Benns:
1Montgelas, op. cit., p. 110.
2Fay, op. cit., I, 45.
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Austria-Hungary still sought to push her way into the Balkans
in order to check the propaganda emanating from Serbia. Ger
many was inclined to support Austria-Hungary’s Balkan program.
For she herself planned to exploit the rich resources of Asia
Minor and for the latter purpose needed a railway route through
friendly territory in the Balkans as well as predominance in
Constantinople. Obviously the German and Austrian plans for
a Drang Nach Osten conflicted with Russia’s desire to accomplish
her “historic mission” of acquiring Constantinople and the
Straits, together with domination in the Balkans. The ambitions
of the Two Teutonic empires militated, also, against the reali
zation of Italy’s hopes for territorial expansion, for the
latter- -in addition to her ambitions in Africa and Asia. Minor--
desired to control the eastern coast of the Adriatic in order
that she might transform that sea into an Italian lake. And
Great Britain and France, despite the fact that they possessed
the first and second largest overseas empires respectively- -or
because of that fact--were disturbed lest some p~wer might seek
to obtain a “place in the sun” at their expense.
This continuous drive toward expansion on the part of the powers created
suspicion and friction. It set the stage for many of the crises that were
to break out in the Near East and the Balkan.
In these areas, each of the great powers, Russia, France, Germany,
and Austria-Hungary claimed special interest. France and Germany almost
went to war over Morocco between 1905-1912. During this period, France
had hopes of assuming a protectorate over Morocco and took steps to
accomplish her aim. In 1905, Germany under the instigation of Bulow
insisted on a conference of the signatories of the Madrid Agreement 1880.
In this regard Bulow said, “If France wished to seize economic or polit
ical power in Morocco, the remaining signatories of that Madrid Confer
ence of 1880 must be asked for their permission.”2 The French finally
1Benns, op. cit., p. 8.
2Bernhard Bulow, Memoirs of Prince von Bulow: From the Morocco
Crisis to Resignation 1903-1909, trans. Geoffrey Dunlop (Boston: Little,
Brown, and Co., 1931), II, 123.
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agreed to the settlement of the differences through a congress of the
signatories. The outcome of the conference was an economic understanding
between Germany and France. This settlement, however, did not end French
attempts to establish a protectorate over Morocco. As late as 1911, France
was still trying to create in Morocco a vassal state. Under the pretense
of putting down a revolt at Fez, France tried to occupy Morocco.1 The
Germans reacted to this move by sending the gunboat Panther to the port
of Agadir. War probably would have occured, but neither party wanted it.
Bosnia-Herzegovina proved to be another tense spot for the European
countries in 1908. In this year, Austria Hungary formally annexed the two
provinces. Russia agreed to assume a friendly attitude twoard the annexa
tion if her warships were allowed to pass through the Straits at Constan
tinople.2 After the agreement became known, a storm of protest followed.
Russia was not able to get her plan to open the Straits approved and had
to abandon it. She then joined the other powers in insisting that an
International conference be held to settle the issue. When Austria-Hungary
would not agree to this war seemed impending. Its development was re
tarded by the fact that Russia and France were too weak to stand up to
the Dual Monarchy. This was especially true since Germany backed the Dual
Monarchy in this conflict. Russia backed down and Serbia was forced to
recognize the annexation and declare that it was not detrimental to her
interests
‘B. DeSiebert and George Abel Schreiner, Entente Diplomacy and the
World (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1921), p. 587.
2oswald Henry Wedel, Austro-German Diplomatic Relations 1908-1914
(California: Stanford University Press, 1923), p. 58.
3Benns, op. cit., p. 16.
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Although Russia was forced to abandon Serbia in her moment of
distress because of military unpreparedness, she promised never to do it
again. While informing Serbia of her inability to save Bosniz-Herzegovina:
the assurance was given that in two or three years’
time Russia would be so well armed that she would be able
to conduct a war of offense even with some prospect of
success. Serbia must await that time with patience, and
continue her work with exp~dition for the completion of
her military preparations.
There existed no area in the world that was as tense as the Balkan
and Near East. The great powers, Russia, France, England, Austria-Hungary,
and Germany all claimed special interests in these areas. England kept
a close eye on this area because of its close proximity to Egypt and
India. In the meantime, Russia was searching for an outlet to the sea
and trying to open the Straits to her warships. Austria-Hungary and
Germany busied themselves with acquiring railroad rights in these areas.
Any developments in the areas would effect the great powers in one way or
another. This tenseness gave way to the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913.
The Balkan countries were fighting for more territory, first from Turkey
and then from each other.
These international disputes, not precipitated by Germany, had
unfortunate results for her and the Dual Monarchy. They drew the French
and English closer together into an alliance that was to engage in mili
tary conversations. These disputed also, caused Russia, France, and Serbia
to prepare for the day when they could repay Austria-Hungary and Germany
for the humiliation they had suffered at their hands.
Bogitshevich, Causes of the War: An Examination into the
Causes of the:.European War with Special Reference to Russia and Serbia
(Amsterdam: C. L. Langerhuysen, 1919), p. 23.
CHAPTER II
AUSTRO-GERJ~AN RELATIONSHIPS AND THE REJECTION OF PEACE PROPOSALS
The actual occasion for war presented itself in the form of the
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. The act in it
self was very insignificant, but became significant when the powers used
it to achieve certain aims. Serbia used the crime to achieve her desire
to push for a Greater Serbia. At the same time, Austria was using this
as an excuse to deal Serbian nationalistic desires a blow. She looked
upon this as an opportune time to stop the unfavorable agitation emanating
from Serbia.
The Sarajevo crime occurred while the Archduke and his wife were
visiting Bosnia-Herzegovina to attend military maneuvers. The Archduke
was Inspector-in-Chief of the army, who represented Francis Joseph. This
was not a purely military trip, although it was made for the purpose of
reviewing the military maneuvers. The trip had political overtones. High
officials in the government felt that the trip would strengthen Serbia’s
loyalty to the Crown and offset the revolutionary elements present.1
The assassination was planned by the Black Hand, a secret
organization in Serbia. Three individuals, Nedeslko Chabrinovitch,
1~Sidney H. Zebel, A History of Europe Since 1870, ed. Walter
Consuelo Longsam (Chicago: J. B. Lipponcott Co., 1948), pp. 357-9.
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Gavrilo Princip and Tryfon Grabezh were chosen by the organization to
1
assassinate the Archduke and his wife. The murderers were to carry out
their duty while the Royal party was touring the chief city of Bosnia.
In this connection, the first attempt on the Archduke and his wife’s life
was made by Nedselko Chabrinovitch. Chabrinovitch flung a bomb at Ferdi
nand’s car, but it missed and exploded behind his car wounding one official
and several bystanders.
The Royal party continued to the Town Hall where a formal welcome
was to be made. The proceeding at the Town Hall went ahead as planned.
On the return trip, a new route was followed. The chauffeur of the Arch
duke’s car was not clear on the new route, and turned up the wrong street.
As he stopped to turn around, another Bosnian by the name of Gavrilo
Princip leaped out and drew a revolver and fatally wounded the Archduke
and his wife.
The news of the assassination aroused shock and heartfelt syrnpathy
at the capitals of Europe. This is, with the exception of Serbia. Hart
said that:
the Serbian press made little effort to conceal its
pleasure, and the Serbian public still less, while the
government which, exhausted by the Balkan Wars, bad every
incentive for peace in order to consolidate its gains, was
foolishly remiss in making or offering an investigation into
the complicity of its subjects.2
It was felt by the European powers that Austria-Hungary would take some
type of action against Serbia, just what no one knew. In th~ opinion of
M. Edith Durham, The Serajevo Crime (London: George Allen &
Unwin, Ltd., 1925), pp. 75-9.
2Liddell Hart, A History of the World War 1914-1918 (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1935), p. 38.
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Montgelas, “the whole world expects that Austria-Hungary would deal
severely with Serbia.”1
Austria-Hungary took the position that the assassination was a
threat to the Empire. Since she was a polygot nation, she had to fear
revolts from minority groups being swept by the currents of Pan-Slavism.
Barnes contends that:
any serious and successful revolt of one of those
subject nationalities would have been a signal for simi
lar efforts on the part of the others, with the resulting
disintegration of the whole political structure of the
Dual Monarchy.2
The Dual Monarchy looked upon this as the time to put a stop to the
unfavorable propaganda and the political unrest emanating from Serbia.
The time had come to suppress Serbia’s national aims.
Berlin was especially touched by the news of the assassination.
She was an ally of Austria-Hungary and as such would feel the repercus
sions of the acts. The effects of the assassination on the Dual Monarchy
would be felt by Germany. The assassination was also hard felt in Berlin
because the Kaiser was a close friend of the Archduke and his wife. The
Kaiser was shocked and appalled by this incident. This act so completely
shocked the Kaiser, that his attitude toward Serbia was drastically
changed. Before the assassination, he had maintained a friendly attitude
toward Serbia. On two occasions, between 1912 and 1913, he restrained
Austria from crushing Serbia. His fondness for Serbia existed as late as
July 1, 1914.~
1Montgelas, op. cit., p. 115.
2Barnes, op. cit., p. 175.
3Ibid., p. 247.
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The assassination frightened the Kaiser for several reasons. He saw it
as a danger to himself since he was royalty, for he was possessed by the
idea that he might be next. To further compound his fear of being next,
news circulated that the twelve assassins were on their way to assassi
nate him. The act further frightened the Kaiser, because he saw it as
a blow to Austria-Hungary’s hegemony. The Kaiser assumed that if the
assassination was allowed to succeed it would weaken Austria-Hungary and
she too would become the second sick man of Europe. He was also of the
assumption, that if it was allowed to succeed the other nationals in the
Dual Monarchy would revolt and Germany would be left with a weak ally.1
That is an ally that is no longer an asset, but a liability.
This change in the Kaiser’s attitude can be seen on several
occasions. One such occasion occurred when he received an account of
the attitude of Sir Edward Grey. The Kaiser remarked:
Grey is committing the error of setting Serbia on the same
plane with Austria and other Great Powers! That is unheard
of! Serbia is nothing but a band of robbers that must be
seized for its crimes!2
Furthermore his attitude had changed so completely that he was
enthusiastically hoping that Austria would move against Serbia severely
and rapidly. In this regard he said, “Serbia must bedealt with, and as
soon as possible.”3 As far as he was concerned, the movement against
Serbia could take the form of a localized war, although it did not have
to take the form of a war to be successful. Although it could take the
‘Ibid., p. 248.
2lbid., p. 250.
3Bloch, op. cit., p. 48
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form of a war, he was definitely against it becoming a general European
conflagration. He did not want Germany involved, but he felt that if
Russia, England, or France was brought into the conflict Germany would
have to live up to her agreement as an ally of Austria-Hungary. Rather
than be faced with this possibility, he preferred Austria to deal with
Serbia quickly in an effort to keep the war localized. The Kaiser was
of the opinion that the sooner Austria acted, the less chance there was
for the war to become anything other than a localized.one)
The Kaiser was hasty in forming his opinions, however, the other
high officials at Berlin were not. They continuously tried to restrain
Austria-Hungary in her action. The German Ambassador Tschirschky was us
ing every opportunity to warn Austria not to be hasty in her decisions
concerning what was to be done with the Serbians.2 He wanted Austria-
Hungary to be sure of her actions and the consequences that would result
from them. He made efforts to keep the Dual Monarchy from taking any steps
that would be detrimental to her allies and Europe as a whole. The German
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Zimmermann also aided
Tschirschky in persuading Austria-Hungary to be cautious. A telegram was
sent by the Austrian Ambassador in Berlin which personified Zimmerinann’s
words of restraint and caution. He telegraphed:
Ziinmermann German Under-Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs assured me that he would consider decisive action
on the part of Austria, with whom the whole civilized world
today was in sympathy, quite comprehensible, but still he
1
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would recommend the greatest caution, and advise that
no humiliating demands be made upon Serbia.1
Berchtold, the Austrian Minister, after hearing this restraining
advice set out to convince him that Germany should support Austria-Hungary.
He began by informing Tschirschky of the Greater Serbia propaganda and
pointing out the rumor that the twelve assassins were on their way to
assassinate the Kaiser. He informed Tschirschky that this Belgrade plot
was as much a concern of Germany as of Austria-Hungary. Tschirschky agreed
with Berchtold that if the plot encompassed the Kaiser in any way, it was
a grave concern of the German government. However, he refused Co give
Berlin’s support in favor of a war against Serbia.
In view of the attitude of many high officials in Germany, Berchtold
felt that an immediate attack on Serbia might leave her without an ally.
As a result of this, he deemed it necessary to first acquire the backing
of Germany before attempting to deal with Serbia. With this end in view,
he sent Count Alexander Hoyos as a special emissary to Berlin to inform
William II officially of the assassination. He carried with him an auto
graphed letter from Francis Joseph and a long document. This document
discussed at length why Austria-Hungary should make an alliance with
Bulgaria. it also advocated immediate military action against Serbia.
Francis Joseph’s personal letter reaffirmed the document. Bloch writes
that the letter:
• . repeated the assertions of the memorandum underlined
them and insisted upon the condition essential to the carry




belittlement of Serbia through the formation of a new
Balkan Alliance ~nder the auspices of the Triple
Alliance
The document and letter were presented to the Kaiser on July 5,
at Potsdam by Austrian Ambassador Szogyeny. The Kaiser read the documents
and noted the graveness of the action that Austria intended to take against
Serbia. It was made clear that the Dual Monarchy planned to declare war
on Serbia at the opportune moment. In this action he foresaw that a seri
ous European complication might result, but he had no idea that Austria
would trigger a European war. He outlined the possible consequences of
a possible Austro-Serbian conflict as follows:
The attitude of Russia would be hostile in every respect,
but he had been expecting that for years, and even if war
should occur between Austria-Hungary and Russia, we might be
assured that Germany would side with us, with her traditional
loyalty to the alliance.
Besides, in the present condition of affairs, Russia
would be totally unprepared for war, and would certainly
think twice before issuing a call to arms. But she would
be sure to stir up the other Powers of the Triple Entente
against us, and to fan the flame in the Balkans.2
Although possessed by apprehension, he agreed to the proposals mentioned
in the document. He refused, however, to issue an official statement to
this effect until he had discussed it with his chancellor.
Feeling that everything was under control and that Europe was
free from a world conflagration, the Kaiser proceeded to prepare for
his vacation. Before leaving, however, he held a conference with
1
Bloch, op. cit., p. 47.
2Pierre Renouvin, The Immediate Origins of the War, 28th June:
4th August 1914, trans. Theodore Carswell Hume (New Haven: Yale Univer
sity Press, 1928), p. 41.
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representatives of the army and navy to inform them of his meeting with
the Austrian Ambassador. At this meeting, he made it clear that no mili
tary preparations were to be made. A day later on July 6, he met with
the Prussian Minister of War, Falkenhayn, concerning the same meeting.
They discussed the Austro-Serbian conflict, but did not discuss warlike
issues. The Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, was summoned on the same day
as Falkenhayn. He discussed with the Kaiser the general situation and
1
the official statement to be issued. The statement read as follows:
As far as concerns Serbia, His Majesty, of course cannot
interfere in the dispute now going on between Austria-
Hungary and that country, as it is a matter not within his
competence. The Emperor Franz Joseph may, however, rest
assured that his Majesty will faithfully stand by Austria-
Hungary, as is by the obligations of his alliance and of
his ancient friendship.2
This statement was the famous blank check given to Austria-Hungary
by Germany. It caused the Austrians to feel that they had unconditional
German backing. Thus they felt they had a free hand to do what was neces
sary to deal with the Serbs and still have the support of Germany. This
proved to be an irresponsible, foolish act on the part of Germany. It
put Austria out of the reach of Germany’s control in the Serbian conflict.
No longer could Germany restrain Austria in her effort to punish Serbia.
Fay analyzed the German bungling as follows:
They gave Austria a free hand and made the grave mistake
of putting the situation outside of their. control into the
hands of a man as reckless and unscrupulous as Berchtold.
They committed themselves to a leap in the dark. They soon
1
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found themselves involved, as we shall see, in actions
which they did not approve, and by decisions which were
taken against their advice; but they could not seriously
object and protest--at least until the eleventh hour when
it proved too late- -because they had pledged their support
to Austria in advance, and any hesitation on their part
would only weaken the Triple Alliance at a critical moment
when it most needed to be strong. The Kaiser and his ad
visers on July 5 and 6 were not criminals plotting the World
War; they were simpletons putting a noose about their necks
and handing the other end of the rope to a stupid and ~iumsy
adventurer who now felt free to go as far as he liked.
In connection with the Kaiser’s receiving the Austrian Ambassador,
Szogyeny, at Potsdam on July 5 and the receiving of representatives of
the army and navy, Falkenhayn, and Chancellor Bethmafln-HollWeg, a legend
has arose. The rumor was started by a waiter in the Kaiserhof Hotel in
Berlin. He misinterpreted some gossip he overheard between some subor
dinate German officers and some members of the Austrian Embassy who were
dining at the hotel. The legend really got out of handin 1918 as a re
sult of the Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story by the American Ambassador to
Turkey, Henry Morgenthau. Morgenthau insinuated that on July 5, 1914, a
legendary Potsdam Crown Conference was held. The Kaiser was supposed to
have met with the economic, political, and military leaders of Germany
and Austria-Hungary and informed them of his plan for a general war. In
this conference the Kaiser was supposed to have asked those present if
the country was in readiness for the war. With the exception of the bank
ers, everyone answered in the affirmative. The Kaiser granted them two
weeks to put their finance in readiness for the war, it has been alleged.
During this time, he created a sense of false security in Europe by
1Fay, op. cit., II, 223.
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going on a two weeks vacation. The ultimatum, which was to be delivered
to Serbia, was to be delayed for two weeks during the time of preparation.1
Fay, the historian, proved that the Potsdam Conference did not
exist. The persons who were alleged to have been at Potsdam were else
where and could not have been plotting a war on July 5. The ambassadors
mentioned by Mr. Morgenthau were not present at this alleged conference.
The heads of the army and navy were likewise absent from Potsdam on July 5.
Similarly false, was the accusations about delay in his story. The Kaiser,
it was alleged, allowed a delay in the sending of the ultimatum in order
to give the bankers time to get the finances ready for a war. The Kaiser
had nothing to do with the delay in the sending of the ultimatum to Serbia.
The Austrians delayed sending the ultimatum to Serbia, because they had
to secure the consent of Tisza, the Premier of Hungary, for war. It took
two weeks for him to be convinced of the plausibility of war. Perhaps
the most important reason for the delay was to make sure that Poincare and
Viviani had left Petrograd ai~ were inaccessible on the high seas at the
time the ultimatum was delivered. Moreover, his assertions about the
Germans selling stocks and securities in anticipation of war are equally
false. The Stock Market showed no tremendous increase in the selling of
stocks or a decline in the value of stocks during this period. The stocks
mentioned by Mr. Morgenthau declined only slightly and this was due to
American conditions and not to the Germans literally dumping stocks on the
market. The Stock Market did not take a terrific dive until after the
ultimatum had been delivered and the terms became known.2
1Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgentbau’s Story (New York:
Doubleday, Page, & Co., 1918), pp. 84-5.
2Fay, op. cit., II, 69-82.
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The entire myth of the Potsdam Crown Conference has been proven
to be false. With the falseness of this myth proven, a portion of the
Entente case against Germany disappeared. It was so clearly rendered
false that even Poincare, who after looking at all the evidence, had been
1
compelled to admit that there was no Potsdam Crown Conference.
Having dispelled with the notion of the legendary Potsdam Crown
Conference, those events taking place after Germany gave Austria-Hungary
the blank check shall be discussed. Berchtold, after receiving the blank
check, cautiously proceeded with his plans. He had yet to win over Tisza
to the idea of war, but this was done by July 14. At this time he moved
forward with the German blank check in one hand and his government’s con
sent in the other to draft the ultimatum. By this time according to Fay,
he refused to listen to the advice of Germany or keep her abreast of what
was going on. Germany advised Austria to come to terms with Italy and to
assemble the evidence surrounding the Greater Serbia agitation and put
it before Europe shortly before the ultimatum was submitted to Serbia.
The Austrians refused to heed this advice and after July 14, kept Germany
in the dark as to what was going on.2
The Germans repeatedly tried to get information concerning
Austria’s aims and the precise terms of the ultimatum. It was not until
July 18 that they received a vague notion of what the ultimatum was to
contain. They found out that Austria would ask Serbia to issue a procla
mation stating that she would dissociate herself from the Greater Serbia
movement, help carry on an investigation with the aid of one Austrian, and
1Barnes, op. cit., pp. 245-6.
2Fay, op. cit., II, 254-60.
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punish the conspirators. The Germans also knew that Serbia would have
forty-eight hours to accept or reject the demands and that they would be
so framed until she could not accept them.1 After this date, Germany was
not given any more information until the ultimatum was on its way to
Serbia.
On July 22, Betbmann-Hollweg and Herr von Jagow were given copies
of the ultimatum, after it was on its way to Serbia. Both after reading
it thought the ultimatum too sharp and went too far in its demands. Ac
cording to Bloch, “Jagow considered the note to be too harsh, in its form
as well as in its contents.”2 Each wanted the note toned down, but found
this was impossible since at that very moment it was being delivered at
Belgrade. There was nothing left for the Germans to do but support it,
or give Austria’s prestige a great blow for it was their blank check which
put the ultimatum out of their reach. The Germans bad agreed to leave the
question of how to deal with Serbia to the Austrians and agreed to support
her in whatever action she took. As a result of the blank check and the
hand-off attitude, they allowed themselves to be kept in the dark about
the exact demands, while upholding them.
The German Emperor was astonished at how far the Serbs had finally
gone toward accepting the Austrian demands. He felt Serbia’s reply to
be very conciliatory, although it was composed of numerous reservations.
However, there was only one point that was definitely refused, “the
participation of Austrian officials in the judicial inquiry of the Sarajevo
I
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plot.”1 The Kaiser felt that all reason for war had dissipated, after
Serbia’s reply was so conciliatory. He made the following marginal note
to this effect:
A brilliant performance for a time limit of only forty-
eight hours. This is more than one could have expected a
great moral victory for Vienna; but with it every reason for
war drops away, and Giesl (Austrian Minister to Serbia) might
have remained quietly in Be1grade~ On the strength of this
I should never have ordered mobilization.2
The Kaiser along with the other diplomats, after July 23, spent
their time proposing peace plans that would insure peace in a tense and
explosive Europe. All of the great powers with the exception of Austria-
Hungary wanted peace. The only drawback was their reluctance to make
concessions to obtain it. Each alliance wanted the other to restrain its
members. According to Simonds:
Germany insisted that the war could only be averted by action
of Britain and France in restraining Russia from intervening
in the quarrel between Serbia and Austria, while Britain in
sisted that Austria should be compelled, by her Germany ally,
to submit her dispute with Serbia to a European conference
and asked Germany to restrain Austria.3
A number of diplomatic conversations took place between July 26
and July 27 in an effort to keep a world conflagration from breaking
out. Germany tried to keep the Austro-Serbian conflict localized. Sir
Edward Grey of England tried to prevent a war, localized or international.
In this direction he proposed on July 26, that the German, French,
‘Bernadotte E.Schmitt, “July 1914: Thirty Years After,” Journal
of Modern History, XVI (Sept., 1944), p. 185.
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and Italian Ambassador meet with him in England in an attempt to find a
satisfactory solution to the crisis. This proposal by Grey was not ac
ceptable to Germany or Austria-Hungary. Russia and France were quite
skeptical of this proposal also. The Germans turned the idea of the
conference down by saying:
• • . that the conference suggested would practically
amount to a court of arbitration and could not in his
opinion be called together except at the request of
Austria and Russia. He could not, therefore, fall in
with it.1
Although Germany did not agree to the first proposal, she was in accord
with the proposal of mediation between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Germany
readily accepted this proposal and worked actively to get Austria to ac
cept it. This plan failed because it proved to be unacceptable to both
Russia and France. President Poincare was of the opinion that:
a conversation a deux between Austria and Russia
would be very dangerous at the present moment, and seemd
favorable to moderating counsels by France and England
at Vienna.2
The failure of the second plan led Germany to suggest a plan for
maintaining peace. This plan provided for direct conversation between
Austria-Hungary and Russia. On this occasion Austria accepted the plan,
but it proved unworkable because of Russia’s attitude. Italy on July 27,
made the most workable proposal. She proposed that a conference of Eng
land, France, Germany, and herself be held to solve the conflict. This
conference would be committed to the complete acceptance by Serbia of the
‘Oxford Faculty of Modern History, Why We Are At War: Great
Britain’s Case (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), p. 72.
2Fay, op. cit., II, 366.
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Austrian ultimatum, not before Austria but before the conference. This
proposal was shun by the great powers with the exception of Germany.
1
Germany liked it and tried to persuade Austria not to reject the proposal.
One last effort was made by Lord Grey to preserve the peace. His effort
came in the form of a proposal for mediation between Austria-Hungary and
Serbia. This proposal was accepted by Germany, but rejected by Austria.
This plan was later, July 31, approved by Austria, but the approval came
too late. The world was standing on the brink of a world war. Russia had
mobilized and France was following suit.
The Germans seeing that the conflict could not be localized did
not want Austria, after Serbia had been so conciliatory, to involve Europe
in a major conflagration. Efforts were made to bring the rebellious
Austria-Hungary, who had declared war so as to keep a peaceful solution
from being achieved, under control. In an attempt to restrain Austria-
Hungary, on July 27 the Kaiser introduced a plan whereby she was to occu
py Belgrade. He felt that this plan would be satisfactory to Austria and
Russia, and put it forth in a letter to von Jagow on July 28. The plan
read as follows:
Nevertheless, the piece of paper (Serbian reply) like
its contents, can be considered as of little value so long
as it is not translated into deeds. The Serbs are orien
tals, therefore liars, tricksters, and masters of evasion.
In order that these beautiful promises may be turned to
truths and facts, a douce violence must be exercised. This
should be so arranged that Austria would receive a hostage
(Belgrade) as a guaranty for the enforcement and carrying
out of the promises, and should occupy it until the petita
had actually been complied with. This is also necessary in
order to give the army, now unnecessarily mobilized for the
1
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third time, the external satisfaction d’horveur of an
ostensible success in the eyes of the world, and to make
it possible for it to feel that it had at least stood on
foreign soil. Unless this were done, the abandonment of
the campaign might be the cause of a wane of bad feeling
against the Monarchy, which would be dangerous in the
highest degree. In case Your Excellency shares my views,
I propose that we say to Austria: Serbia has been forced
to retreat in a very humiliating manner, and we offer our
congratulations. Naturally, as a result, every cause for
war has vanished. But a guaranty that the promises will
be carried out is unquestionably necessary. That could be
secured by means of the temporary military occupation of
a portion of Serbia, similar to the way we kept troops
stationed in France in 1871 until the billions were paid.
On this basis, I am ready to mediate for peace withAustria.
Any proposals or protests to the contrary by other nations
I should refuse regardless, especially as all of them have
made more or less open appeals to me to assist in maintain
ing peace. This I will do in my own way and as sparingly
of Austria’s nationalistic feeling, and of the honor of her
arms as possible. For the latter has already been appealed
to on the part of the highest war lord, and is about to re
spond to the appeal. Consequently it is absolutely necessary
that it receive a visible satisfaction d’hoveur; thisis the
prerequisitive of my mediation.1
Germany, from the time the ultimatum became known, tried to avert
a European war. From the outset she tried to localize the conflict be
tween Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Germany gave the Dual Monarchy a free
hand in dealing with Serbia, but now she reversed herself. Seeing the im
possibility of localizing the conflict, Germany engaged in a campaign to
impress upon her ally the seriousness of a war and a few of the peace
proposals. Zilliacus contends that:
• . so long as she believed that Great Britain would stay
out, Germany encouraged Austria to go ahead. Later, when
she found Great Britain would fight, the German Government 2
turned round and put pressure on Austria to be conciliatory.
1Barnes, op. cit., pp. 258-9.
2K. Zilliacus, Mirror of the Past (New York: Current Books,
Inc., 1946), p. 115.
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Although the peace proposals failed, Germany efforts to avert a war did
not end. She continued to send telegrams to Vienna urging mediation.
As late as the night of July 30, Betbmann-HollWeg sent two urgent tele
grams to Tschirschky.~ Each was an S. 0. S. to get Austria to reconsider
the proposal or face the fact that they would be fighting against four
powers. Insofar as he was concerned, Rumania and Italy could not be
counted on to give aid. In the second telegram he reaffirmed Germany’s
position as an ally, but he said:
We are ready to fulfill the obligations of our alliance,
but must decline to allow ourselves to be drawn by Vienna
light-heartedly and without attention to our proposals into
a world conflagration.1
1Theodor Wolff, The Eve of 1914, trans. E. W. Dickes (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1936), p. 499.
CHAPTER III
THE OUThREAK OF HOSTILITY AN]) THE BEGINNING
OF ThE FIRST WORLD WAR
Although the countries of Europe were discussing ways of settling
the Austro-Serbian conflict, the situation continued to deterioate.
Serbia mobilized only to be followed by Austria-Hungary, who issued a
declaration of war against Serbia on July 28. Hereafter, Austria was not
to entertain any ideas or proposals concerning peace. She turned down the
proposal madeby Russia to enter into a discussion of the terms of the
ultimatum and the Serbian’s reply. Insofar as Austria-Hungary was concern
ed, the time had passed for discussion and a condition of war existed.
She did, however, re-affirm her position on the question of land acquisi
tion. It was made clear that no Serbian land was to be annexed by the
Dual Monarchy if the conflict remained localized.
However, the conflict was not to be localized between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia. Russia was not in a position to allow Serbia to be
crushed. She would rather face total war than the possibility of Austria
Hungary becoming the predominant power in the Balkan. This view was ex
pressed by the Russian minister for foreign affairs, Sergei Sazonov, when
he said, “Russia cannot allow Austria to crush Servia and become
predominant power in Balkans, and secure of support of France, she will
36
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face all the risks of war.” This decision on the part of Russia, forever
put the conflict outside the realm of localization and into the arena of
a general European war.
Russia began to make secret preparation for mobilization against
Austria-Hungary as early as July 24.2 Soldiers were called up for mili
tary duty, the reservists and militias were put on military alert, and
the country as a whole was being put on a war footing. The Russians drew
up plans for partial mobilization that were put into effect on July 29,
after the bombardment of Belgrade. Russia justified partial mobilization
by stating that, “since Austria-Hungary had mobilized eight corps, Russia
found herself compelled to mobilize the military districts on the Austrian
frontier.”3 Although mobilized, Russia declared that she did not mean
war. However, the majority of the great powers looked upon mobilization
as a declaration of war. Benns contends that, “it was generally under
stood between the French and Russian experts that mobilization was equiva
lent to a declaration of war.”4
Russia began as early as July 26, to mobilize secretly against
Germany. After the Tsar agreed to total mobilization on July 29, the
Kaiser became alarmed and sent a telegram to the Tsar asking him to press
for peace. The telegram read as follows:
1Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Coming of the War 1914 (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1930), II, 87.
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I therefore suggest that it would be quite possible
for Russia to remain a spectator of the Austro-Serbian
conflict without involving Europe in the most horrible
war she ever witnessed. I think a direct understanding
between your Government and Vienna possible and desirable
and as I have already telegraphed to you, my exertions to
promote it. Of course military measures on the part of
Russia would precipitate a calamity we both wish to avoid
and jeopardize my position as mediator which I readily
accepted on your appeal to my friendship and my help.
This telegram led the Tsar to stop general mobilization and revert to
partial mobilization. However, the state of partial mobilization was
to exist for only a short period of time. On July 30, Tsar Alexander
again ordered general mobilization of the Russian army. He made this
detrimental decision after discussing the situation with Sazonov, the
military leaders, and after reading another one of the willy-nilly
telegrams. The telegram read as follows:
My ambassador has instructions to direct the attention
of your government to the dangers and serious consequences
of mobilization. Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against
Serbia and only a part of their army. If Russia mobilizes
against Austria-Hungary the part of mediator with which you
have entrusted me in such a friendly manner, and which I
have accepted at your express desire, is threatened if not
rendered impossible.
The entire weight of the decision now rests on your
shoulders. You have to bear the responsibility of war or
peace.2
The Tsar disregarded the telegram from the Kaiser and listened to the
advice of Sazonov. Sazonov along with the military leaders convinced the
Tsar of the feasibility of general mobilization and of the fact that
Germany was not sincere in her peace efforts. They declared that Germany
was only.stalling for time.
1Schmitt, op. cit., p. 110.
2George Malcolm Thomson, The Twelve Days: 24 July to 4 August
1914 (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1964), p. 125.
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Faced with Russia’s mobilization, Germany proceeded to warn
Russia of the graveness of this act. In this connection the following
telegram was dispatched to the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg to be
delivered to the proper person. The Germans telegraphed:
In spite of negotiations still pending and although we
have up to this hour made no preparations for mobilization,
Russia has mobilized her entire army and navy, hence also
against us. On account of these Russian measures we have
been forced for the safety of the country, to proclaim the
threatening state of war, which does not yet imply mobili
zation. Mobilization, however, is bound to follow if
Russia does not stop every measures of war against us and
against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours and notifies
us definitely to that effect. Please communicate this at
once to M. Sazanoff and wire hour of communication.’
This message was communicated to the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazanoff,
at midnight on July 31. At 12:52 p.m. on August 1, 1914, no answer bad
been received in Berlin to the ultimatum.
Having received no answer within the allotted time, Bethmann
Hollweg dispatched another telegram to the German Ambassador at St.
Petersburg. It read as follows:
In case the Russian Government gives no satisfactory
answer to our demand, Your Excellency will please transmit
at 5 o’clock this afternoon (Central European time) the
following statement:
The Imperial Government has endeavored from the
beginning of the crisis to bring it to a peaceful solution.
In accordance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty
the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany,
in cooperation with England, took upon himself the role of
mediation between the cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg;
but Russia, without awaiting the outcome, proceeded to mobi
lize her entire land and naval forces.
As a consequence of this threatening measure, occasioned
by no military preparation on the part of Germany, the German
1Lucius Hudson Holt and Alexander Wheeler Chilton, The History
of Europe from 1862 to 1914 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1917), p. 559.
40
Empire found itself confronted by a serious and eminent
peril. If the Imperial Government had failed to meet this
peril, it would have jeopardized the safety and even the
existence of Germany. consequently the German Government
was obliged to address the Government of the Emperor of
all the Russians and insisted upon cessation of all these
military measures. Russia not having thought it should
reply to this demand, and having manifested by this atti
tude that her acts were directed against Germany, I have
the honor by order of my Government to make known to Your
Excellency the following communication:
His Majesty the Emperor, my august sovereign, in the
name of the Empire takes up the defiance and considers
himself in a state of war against Russia.
I urgently ask you to wire the hour according to
Russian time, of arrival of these instructions, and of
their carrying out.
Kindly ask for your passports and hand over the
protection of German interests to the American Embassy.
After the Russians did not answer within the allotted time,
Germany entered the phase of mobilization. She had promised Austria-
Hungary that she would keep Russia out of the conflict, this she had
tried to do by threat of mobilization. Russia, however, was determined
not to back down in the face of a Teutonic threat on this occasion. She
refused to suffer again the humiliation or loss of prestige in the Balkan -
that she had suffered in 1908, when Austria-Hungary annexed Boxnia
Herzegovina. This time she refused to desert Serbia in her time of need.
Instead she preferred to stand up to Austria-Hungary and Germany if neces
sary. Receiving no answer from Russia, Germany began to mobilize at 5 p.m.
on August 1. An hour later, she declared war on Russia.
From the declaration of war against Russia, Germany’s attitude,
like that of the other continental powers, was determined by military
considerations. She was concerned with getting the war underway and as
a result made many diplomatic blunders. Finding herself entangled in a
1~Ibid., p. 560.
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war, she tried to secure the neutrality of France and Britain. The French
being allies of Russia were asked for a promise of neutrality in a Russo-
German war. To this inquiry the French answered that, “France will have
regard to her own interests.”1 The Germans took this evasive and ambig
uous answer as support for Russia and precipitated events by issuing a
declaration of war against France on August 3.
Fearing the possibility of being attacked from two sides, Germany
acted under the doctrine that, “when war has become necessary it is essen
tial to carry it on in such a way as to place all the chances in one’s
favour.”2 Following the Schlieffen Plan, the Germans planned to swing
through Belgium and defeat France within six weeks, after which they would
turn their strength against Russia.
In an attempt to defeat France in a hurry so that she could turn
her attention to Russia, Germany made a big blunder. The only way that
she could knock France out quickly was to march through Belgium, a neu
tral country. Germany requested that her troops be permitted to march
through Belgium. The Belgians refused this request, but the Germans
pleading military necessity proceeded to march through Belgium. This
was in direct opposition to the international treaty of 1839, which es
tablished Belgium as a neutral state.3 The German Chancellor admitted
that to march through Belgium was a violation of her neutrality, but he
promised that her sovereignty would be guaranteed and she would be
compensated for the damages she received after the war. In this same
‘Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, trans.
Isabella N. Massey (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), III, 194.
2Annonymously, I Accuse~, trans. Alexander Gray (New York:
Grosset & Dunlap Publishers, 1915), p. 139.
x or acu ty, op,, cit., p. 18.
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connection, Germany committed another diplomatic blunder when one of her
diplomats referred to the treaty guaranteeing Belgium’s neutrality as a
scrap of paper.1 The Belgians in defense of their neutrality resisted
the Germans valiantly and threw the German military time table off.
Belgium appealed to England and France for help against Germany.
England came to the defense of Belgium and the sanctity of
treaties, by declaring war against Germany at midnight on August 4.
Earlier, August 2, she had assured France that she would protect her
coastline in case of an attack by Germany. Although a state of war ex
isted between Germany and England, as late as August 5, Grey let it be
known that he would always be ready to mediate. At the same time to
Ambassador Lichnowsky he said, “We don’t want to crush Germany.”2
Zilliacus insinuated that England did not go to war for the sakes
of Belgium’s neutrality, but for reasons of self interest. Britain aided
France and Russia, because she could not allow them to be defeated. If
they were defeated, Germany would be the preponderant power on the Con
tinent and strong enough to challenge England’s position and perhaps
absorb her of her colonies. Zilliacus further believed economic motives
led England to declare war against Germany. The question of Belgium’s
neutrality served as a moral issue to rally the citizens of England and
the World behind the country’s efforts.3
Eventually other nations were to align with the Allied of the
Central Powers. Montengro and Japan were to array themselves with the
1-Albertini, op. cit., p. 496.
2Prince Lichnowsky, ~y Mission to London 1912-1914 (London:
Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1918), p. 37.
3zilliacus, op. cit., pp. 134-139.
43
Allied forces within the first month of the outbreak of hostilities.
Montenegro issued a declaration of war against the Central Powers on
August 10. A few days later, August 23, Japan followed suit and issued
a declaration of war. Italy, Rumania, and the United States were all to
take up the Allied cause as the war progressed. Italy and Rumania enter
ed the war in 1915, after being~ offered certain territorial enticements
after the war. Both former allies of the Central Powers, declared their
neutrality at the start of the conflict. They argued that they had sign
ed defensive pacts with Germany and Austria-Hungary, whereas the two were
fighting an offensive war. The United States entered the war in 1917, as
a result of Germany’s policy of unrestricted submarine warfare.
The Central Powers gained strength also, as the war progressed.
In keeping with a secret treaty, which provided that Turkey would enter
the war on the side of the Central Powers in case Russia intervened in
the conflict, Turkey joined the Central Powers in November, 1915. Bul
garia joined the Central Powers in 1915.
These were the two alliances that faced each other on the Eastern
and Western front from 1914 to 1918.
CHAPTER IV
PROS AND CONS ON THE WAR GUILT OF GERMANY DURING
THE AFTERMATH OF ThE WAR
Article 231 of the Versailles Treaty resulted in a passionately
argued issue in both domestic and international politics. The debates,
however, did not end in the political arenas. They were to extend from
newspapers aid popular magazines, through the office of propagandists
and politicians, to the studies of scholarly historians.
Many countries, in answer to Germany’s refutation of war guilt,
published huge collections of documents from their foreign office archives
covering the period from 1871 to 1914. As a result of this move on the
part of the powers, the historians had a great deal of primary informa
tion at their disposal with which to work. Faced with their opinions
concerning the role of economic, political, intellectual, and social
factors in the formulation of national policies, certain information was
selected for use while other was rejected. This process of selection and
rejection of material played an important role in determining what inter
pretation the historians would put upon the wording of these documents.
Using almost the identical documents, some historians supported Germany’s
guilt while others put forth other theories as to who was guilty of
starting the world conflagration.
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Several schools of thought on Germany’s guilt have evolved over
the years. The oldest school contends that the verdict of the Commission
on War Guilt was just in its accusation that Germany along with her allies
deliberately planned the war. This group consisted of two representatives
from each of the Big Five countries, United States, England, Japan, Italy,
and France, and one each from Belgium, Poland, Serbia, and Greece. The
Commission concluded that the Triple Alliance did certain things which
made a war inevitable. The Commission cites the refusal on the part of
Germany and Austria-Hungary to accept mediation as an example of their
deliberately planningwar. To the Commission this was proof enough that
they did not want to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, but wanted
1war.
Camille Block is in accord with the Versailles verdict. He
stipulated that Germany and Austria-Hungary took advantage of the Sarajevo
crime to deal with the Serbs. He inferred that Germany pushed Austria-
Hungary to take military action against Serbia, although it might end in
a general European war. It was not Russia’s mobilization which led
Germany to declare war, for she had decided on war twelve hours before the
Tsar gave the orders for general mobilization. Germany’s mobilization was
in keeping with a military time table which had been drawn up earlier.2
A. J. P. Taylor, an Oxford scholar, reasserts German responsibility
for the first World War. Taylor concludes that the Triple Entente did not
want a war, but the Triple Alliance needed a war in order to achieve
Lee, op. cit., pp. 1-4.
2
Bloch, op. cit., pp. 183-94.
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certain territorial gains. Nevertheless, he feels that Germany did not
expect a war in August, 1914, but welcomed it when it occurred. She
thought that she was in a position to win the war in 1914, but doubted
her ability to do so in a few years because Austria-Hungary was growing
progressively weaker and France and Russia were gaining in strength and
1
nerves.
Bernadotte E. Schmitt, in The Origins of the First World War,
theorizes that the war occurred because Germany and Austria-Hungary
sought a military solution to the Austro-Serbian conflict. The Triple
Alliance chose war rather than mediation in an attempt to upset the bal
ance of power. It had hopes of exerting its ascendancy in Europe War was
the only way that this aim could be accomplished, so the members of the
Triple Alliance chose war.2
Pierre Renouvin in, The Immediate Origins of the War, charges
Germany and Austria with desiring a war. He contends that they deliber
ately set out to start a war and would not accept any peace proposal
which might jeopardize this aim. Their refusal to accept a peaceful so
lution to the Serbian conflict and their thirst for war against Serbia
threw Europe into a general war.3
A school known as the revisionist was to evolve to challenge
the traditionalist viewpoint of who started World War I. Many eminent
historians have associated with this school and its call for a just and
‘A J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1954), pp. 518-30.
2Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Origins of the First World War (New
York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1958), p. 26.
3Renouvin, op. cit., p. 354.
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fair appraisal of who and what caused the war. The revisionist movement
was pioneered by Count Max Montgelas in 1919, when he assisted in editing
the Kautsky Documents. This work represented the first attempt to pre
sent a complete story of Germany’s pre-war diplomacy. Count Montgelas
did further work in discrediting the Versailles verdict through the writing
of articles and books.
In The Case for the Central Powers, he draws seventeen conclusions
as to war guilt. Count Montgelas believes that Germany sought no gains
in Europe or elsewhere which could only be acquired through war. This
was not true in the case of either France or Russia. France needed a war
in order to recover Alsace and Lorraine, whereas Russia needed a war to
acquire the Straits and Constantinople. In his assault on the Versailles
verdict he disproved several myths. Insofar as armaments were concerned,
Germany was not as well prepared as France and Russia. He admits, how
ever, that it was a mistake for Germany to build a fleet but no will for
war can be reduced from it. He refutated the argument that Germany de
liberately planned the war at Potsdam on July 5 and that she turned down
all attempts at mediation. Germany, it was shown, accepted a majority
of the peace proposal and introduced on her own initiative two methods
of negotiation. Count Montgelas contends that Russia’s mobilization led
Germany to declare war.’
Erich Brandenburg, a German historian, set out to determine
Germany’s role in starting the world war. After looking at a great deal
of documents, he theorizes that it was not Germany but France and Russia
who caused the war. He contends that Germany’s policy after the dropping
1Nontgelas, op. cit., pp. 200-3.
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of Bismarck can be criticized. This criticism can be based on short
sightedness and recklessness, but not on planning a war. At no time did
Germany want or seek a war. Germany’s policy was at no time warlike, if
anything it was too peaceloving. On the other hand, France and Russia
sought a war to achieve certain objectives. Poincare pushed for a war to
achieve revanche and Isvolski sought a war in an effort to achieve control
of the Balkans and the Straits. The immediate cause of the War, Russian
mobilization, was the work of Isvolski and Poincare in search of their
objectives
Harry Elmer Barnes, feeling that a grave injustice had been done
the German people sought to popularize the revisionist position in the
United States. Barnes repudiated the entire notion of the war guilt
thesis. He charges Serbia, France, and Russia with starting the war.
The three countries looked upon the Sarajevo crime as the appropriate
episode to bring about the desired conflict with the Triple Alliance.
They hurriedly prepared for mobilization, knowing that mobilization meant
a general war. Barnes charges Austria-Hungary with war guilt after Serbia,
France, and Russia. Lastly, he places the blame on Germany and England
equally. Although he places the blame on them equally, he contends that
the Kaiser worked harder to preserve the peace than did Sir Edward Grey.2
Sidney Bradshaw Fey, an American, also supports the revisionist
position. Fay stipulates that none of the European Powers wanted war,
but when it seemed inevitable each tried to achieve various advantages.
Pay blames each of the countries, in varying degrees for starting the war.
‘Brandenburg, op. cit., pp. 518-23.
2Barnes, op. cit.
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Each country’s statesmen did certain things or refused to do certain
things which led to mobilizations and declarations of war. Serbia’s
guilt for the war lies in her refusal to give Vienna any foreknowledge
of the Belgrade plot. There exist the possibility that had Austria known
measures could have been taken to avert the fatal crime. Nevertheless,
this was not reason enough for Austria to drag Europe into a war. Austria,
he charges with primary guilt in the conflagration. Rather than abandon
her desire for a war, if she could not have a localized one, she preferred
to deliberately cause a general war. It is unfortunate that Germany felt
obligated to support her ally. She definitely did not plot a war or want
one, and made genuine efforts to avert one. However, she was the victim
of her alliance and as such must assume a share in the responsibility for
causing the war. Russia’s guilt for the war is based on two facts.
First, the encouragement of Serbia to push her nationalistic desires
against Austria and s.econdly, for her hasty mobilization which led Germany
to declare war. Russia’s mobilization rendered a European war inevitable.
England’s position complicated the diplomatic scene and as such she is
charged with starting the war. England’s guilt lies in her refusal to
come out strong on the side of the Entente early in the crisis or declare
her neutrality. Had she declared her intentions of supporting France and
Russia, it is doubtful if Germany would have allowed Austria to involve
Europe in a war. On the other hand, if England had declared her neutral
ity France would have exerted a restraining influence on Russia and kept
her from mobilizing and starting a world war)
I
Fay, op. cit., II, pp. 547-58.
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A few historians writing, on the causes of the war, have not
placed the responsibility for the war on any one country. They have taken
the position that certain conditions existed in 1914 which made the war
inevitable. No one country created these conditions, but all of them
aided in the development of these warlike conditions. The historians
supporting this school are found in the persons of Raymond Aron and
K. Zilliacus.
Aron contends that the war was not caused by the diplomats, but
by the European situation. Europe existed at the time of the Sarajevo
incident in a state of hostility and military preparedness. Every past
incident had aggravated the situation until the conflict in the East caused
it to come to a head. Faced with this new conflict, each alliance willed
peace, but a conditional peace. The European situation would not allow
a country to retreat is the possibility of localization to become a real
ity. Each country was trying to maintain its power and prestige at the
expense of another country. Under these circumstances, the Serbian
problem could only lead to total war.1
In his book, Mirror of the Past, K. Zilliacus puts forth the
thesis that the war was caused by international anarchy, imperialism,
and militarism. Finance capitalism worked on these causes to aggravate
the European scene and made war inevitable. Each country went to war in
defense of its imperialistic interest which were in a sense finance
2
capital.
1Lee, op. cit., pp. 67-72.
2Zilliacus, op. cit., p. 37.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Did Germany cause World War I? After collecting data and making
several observations, the question is no nearer to being answered than
before. It is difficult to place the responsibility for the cause of the
war on this or that statesman, country, or on a chain of events. It would
be easy to say that Germany caused the war, but it is equally as easy to
say that she is not guilty of the crime. Likewise, it would be just as
easy to make the same statement concerning Austria-Hungary, France, Serbia,
and England. There is so much evidence for and against each country that
the decision as to primary responsibility seems to be largely a matter of
arranging the evidence according to the already existing bias of each
investigator.
Of the many countries involved in the crisis, Germany has been
accused of plotting the war. She has been accused on the grounds of an
endless number of ifs such as: if Germany had not built a navy equal to
England’s; if Germany had not lived up to her role as an ally; and if
Germany had supported the peace proposals more vigorously and forced
Austria to accept one of them. Such speculation is, of course, futile.
For as many “ifs’~ raised by the believers of Germany’s guilt there
are as many incidences to refute them. The evidence shows that no desire
for war can be assumed from Germany’s naval building program. The program
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was not extensive enough to challenge Britain’s supremacy on the sea.
At completion, the program would have given Germany only a naval tonnage
of 1.02 million as compared to Britain’s 2.17 million. Her naval program
was a part of a general program to improve her means of protection in an
ever increasing militaristic world. Every country during this period was
increasing its armaments, with Russia and France leading.
The evidence again disproves the myth that Germany supported
Austria in her desire to start a general war. The evidence shows that
Germany supported Austria in a localized conflict with Serbia. It was
made perfectly clear that Germany and Austria from the beginning of the
conflict anticipated a localized conflict. Russia’s position, however,
made localization impossible. Austria, after not being able to localize
the conflict resorted to a world war to achieve her aim of military action
against Serbia. It has been said that Germany should not have supported
Austria. The truth, however, shows that Germany was obligated to do so
if the Dual Monarchy was going to continue as a power to contend with.
Had Germany refused to support Austria as their treaty stipulated and
Austria was dealt a diplomatic defeat, the other nationals in the Empire
would have followed Serbia’s lead and Austria would have become the second
sick man of Europe. This Germany was not in a position to allow. With
the increase in armaments, nationalism, and imperialism, Germany needed
an ally to balance her leading enemies, France and Russia. She could not
abandon her only reliable ally and become isolated between two hostile
camps. Self preservation dictated that Germany support Austria-Hungary.
In judging Germany, it must not be forgotten that Poincare gave Russia the
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same bi k~he~k that Germany gave Austria. Poincare encouraged Russia
with promises of support to stand staunchly behind Serbia and her
nationalistic aims even if it meant a world conflagration.
The evidence refutes the accusation that Germany did not support
the peace proposals vigorously enough. The Kaiser posed as the champion
of peace from the beginning of the Austro-Serbian conflict. It is true
that he urged Austria-Hungary to take immediate steps against Serbia,
but Europe as a whole knew that Austria was going to take some steps
against Serbia for the assassination of the Archduke. Austria decided to
push for a punitive war against the Serbs. The Kaiser felt that a war was
not necessary to punish Serbia and he felt that the Serbian reply to the
Austrian ultimatum was very conciliatory, thus banishing all reasons for
war. From this point he tried to impress upon Austria the importance of
accepting one of the peace proposals put forth by Sir Edward Grey and
himself.
In this effort to find a peaceful solution to the Austro-Serbian
conflict, Germany accepted all of Lord Grey’s proposais save the first one
which provided for a conference of ambassadors from England, France, Italy,
and Germany. Hereafter, she accepted all of the proposals and tried to
impress theni upon her ally. Austria, however, an independent and soverign
nation had the prerogative to accept or reject the proposals put before
her. This prerogative she exercised in rejecting the proposals. She was,
however, not the only power to reject a majority of the proposals for
France and Russia did likewise.
Germany continued to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict,
after the fighting had begun between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Her
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attempts were brought to an abortive end by Russia’s mobilization which
made war inevitable. Germany asked Russia to cease mobilization, but the
plead was answered by general mobilization being ordered by the Tsar on
July 29.
The evidence shows that Germany did not plot a war and did not
want one. Everything was progressing favorably for her under peaceful
conditions. She was thriving industrially and constantly increasing her
percentage of the world’s trade. Likewise, her imperialistic aims were
being realized through the Berlin to Bagdad railway and her diplomatic
triumphs at Constantinople. Although making great strives toward becom
ing the leading continental power, she was enjoying a healthy relationship
with England. A majority of the leaders of Germany recognized their good
fortune and the fact that they had more to gain through peace. ~~Yar would
only jeopardize everything they had carefully built up.
After reviewing the literature in the case, the author takes the
position that the Versailles verdict is unjust and inaccurate. The war
of 1914 cannot be accounted for by any one error of statesmanship or will
for war. The causes of the war were created to some extent by all of the
nations concerned. Europe prior to the outbreak of the war existed in a
state of anarchy. Each state, under the influence of increasing militarism,
imperialism, and nationalism, felt itself to be a sovereign nation recog
nizing no higher authority higher than its own. Each nation felt itself
to be the court of last resort for any question concerning its interest
and welfare, and would leave its fate to an arbiter only when it concerned
national honor or territorial integrity. Under these conditions there
existed always the possibility of war.
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Each country in trying to unite people of the same race, who
spoke the same language, possessed similar customs and traditions, and
inhabited contiguous areas, into, one independent country, was making war
even more likely to occur. The Germans, Italians, Greeks, Belgians,
Serbians, and Rumanians were all trying to realize their goal of becoming
empires. They were realizing these goals by clashing with each other.
This clashing and bitt&rness created a distrust and warlike atmosphere
among the nations of Europe. With conditions as they were, the least
thing, such as an overly ambitious state which felt locked in and was not
able to fulfill its needs or desires could precipitate a world war.
Each international conflict in the Balkans and Near East led Europe
closer to a European war. These conflicts would have led to a war earlier,
but none of the powers felt strong enough to win a war. However, 1914 was
different. France and Russia felt that they were strong enough to contend
with Austria and Germany. At the same time, Austria and Germany felt
themselves strong enough to challenge the Triple Entente. This readiness
and the inability of the alliances to backdown led Europe straight into
a world war.
Germany did not create these warlike conditions which were waiting
for a spark to ignite into a general war along. All of the countries
shared in their development and as such all of them must share in the war
guilt. True, the Austrian desire to punish Serbia after the Sarajevo in
cident signal the beginning of the war. However, the world had been pre
paring the way for war ever since the unification of Germany and Italy.
The Sarajevo crime proved to have been the needed spark to set off a
chain reaction which was to end in war.
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It was not Germany who made war inevitable, after the Sarajevo
crime but France and Russia. The possibility exists that the war could
have been localized had not Russia professed to ascertain certain gains
by mobilizing in protection of Serbia. It was known in Russia that gen
eral mobilization meant a general war, since the alliance system would
come into play.
Present data has shown the unrealistic position of the Versailles
verdict to be untenable. It is inaccurate in charging Germany with the
crime. She did not strive for nor did she start a European war. It was
forced on her by circumstances and like the other countries she accepted
the challenge and mobilized. Unlike the others, she was defeated and at
the mercy of the victors. As the vanquished, she was charged with the
crime, a crime of which she was not guilty.
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